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Background:  During 2001-2005, a number of radical legislative moves expanded patient 
choice in Norway. A similar reform path was followed in the UK, what provides a relatively 
controlled context and conjuncture. Both countries have National Health Systems (NHS), and 
are engaged in mutual policy learning. Those shared structural and policy attributes facilitate 
comparative analysis, and make further policy transfers likely. In this paper we compare the 
development and impact of patient choice reforms in Norway and the UK during the 1990s 
and 2000s. Our main focus is on the 2000s reforms. Objectives:  Coherent with this, the 
paper has five main objectives, each addressed in a separate subsection. First, we analyze the 
evolution of choice reforms in both countries, and its ´goodness of fit´ within broader reform 
packages. Second, we study the main trends in patient mobility before and after the reforms 
were approved. Third, we analyze the micro-level incentives and other policy instruments 
aimed at making choice happen. Fourth, we examine the available evidence on the impact of 
pro-choice reforms, based on individual micro-data for Norway. Fifth, we discuss some policy 
proposals which could help advancing patient choice and improving its system impact.  
Conclusion:  The analysis carried out in this paper has tried to cast new light on the issue of 
choice by formulating new analytical and policy proposals based on a comparative analysis of 
recent data on Norway and the UK. The comparative method helps us to isolate intervening 
mechanisms and analyse impact. In order to make choice happen and have the expected 
results, expanded capacity and incentives to increase activity are required in overloaded NHS 
systems such as Norway and the UK. Moreover, complementary tools would be required to 
make the most out of hospital choice, e.g. strengthened powers and capacity at the primary 
care level and new information transfer tools. The two countries differ, in the period under 
consideration, in choice of policy instruments. In Norway the main focus has been on (a) the 
nation-wide introduction of ABF, and (b) the development of complementary measures to 
expand capacity such as allowing patient choice also to include private and foreign hospitals 
in 2000-2002. In the UK more emphasis has been put on (c) developing information tools and 
(d) introducing GP advice. Our study shows that both countries could offer policy lessons to 





In this paper we compare the development and impact of patient choice reforms in 
Norway and the UK during the 1990s and 2000s. Our main focus is on the 2000s reforms. 
During 2001-2005, a number of radical legislative moves expanded patient choice in 
Norway. A similar reform path was followed in the UK, what provides a relatively 
controlled context and conjuncture. Both countries have National Health Systems (NHS), 
and are engaged in mutual policy learning. Those shared structural and policy attributes 
facilitate comparative analysis, and make further policy transfers likely. 
 
We defend that the 2000s expanded choice reforms in the UK and Norway can be seen as 
part of a second generation of European pro-choice policies, which do not assume that 
choice will automatically happen and result in improved efficiency. Rather, the focus is 
now on designing adequate micro-regulations and coherent reform packages as a way of 
guaranteeing that the required incentives for policy implementation are in place. Hence, 
we depart from the hypothesis that the actual pace and impact of choice reforms depends 
on their complex interactions with wider reform goals and detailed implementation 
mechanisms1 2.  
 
Coherent with this, the paper has five main objectives, each addressed in a separate 
subsection. First, we analyze the evolution of choice reforms in both countries, and its 
´goodness of fit´ within broader reform packages. Second, we study the main trends in 
patient mobility before and after the reforms were approved. Third, we analyze the 
micro-level incentives and other policy instruments aimed at making choice happen. 
Fourth, we examine the available evidence on the impact of pro-choice reforms, based on 
individual microdata for Norway. Fifth, we discuss some policy proposals which could 








2. Patient choice and health system reform  
 
2.1. Defining patient choice 
 
Patient choice and patient mobility are difficult to disentangle from each other both 
conceptually and empirically. We depart from the conceptualization initially made by 
Tessier et al. for Canada3. They divide patient mobility in three different types: (1) 
forced, i.e. resulting from insufficient supply at the local level; (2) physician-induced, i.e. 
resulting from GPs’ referrals preferences and hospital affiliations; (3) mobility due to 
patient choice.  
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Figure 1 extends Tessier et al. framework and outlines our proposed definitions. As 
Tessier et al emphasize, part of (1) is the result of patient choice, as in elective surgery 
where there is often some margin to choose the relative intensity of treatment (with less 
intensive treatment options often being available at the local level). The same can be 
defended in the case of (2), as a majority of patients in OECD countries defend that they 
share most decisions with their GPs, or decide on their own under GP-advise4. Hence, it 
seems reasonable to assume that there is some empirical overlap between (1), (2) and (3). 
In acute and emergency care, the room for choice is small; and pure forced or doctor-
induced mobility likely. Chosen mobility is likely to be mainly restricted to elective 
patients. In addition, some elective patients can choose to remain loyal to their local 
hospitals, i.e. to remain immobile.     
 
2.2. Expanding choice: first and second generation reforms 
 
The first generation of patient choice reforms dates back to the 1940s and 1950s in some 
Social Health Insurance (SHI) countries. In National Health System, pro-choice reforms 
were introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The limited data existing on this 
period points to 1-10% of patients choosing to opt out from their local providers, 
including those who opt out to the private sector on self-funded basis 1 5 9. As for the 
second generation, the Dutch and German reforms promoting free choice of insurer are 
pioneering moves within SHI countries. Launched in the mid 1990s, they are still being 
re-designed and adjusted6. Within tax-funded health systems, the second generation 
started in the late 1990s, and focused on choice of hospitals. Spain and Italy enact 
reforms together with some incentives to boost activity in the late 1990s17. Norway and 
England launch comprehensive pro-choice reform packages from 1997. From January 
2000, about half of the Danish counties implemented ABF incentives linked to extended 
choice reforms2. Scotland is an innovative latecomer8. Sweden, which pioneered first 
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In the UK, first generation reforms started in 1989, and focused more on physician-
induced mobility than patient choice per se. GP fundholders could make extra-contractual 
referrals, which accounted for only 2% of referrals and focused on emergency or tertiary 
services9. In Norway, a commission was appointed by the government in 1991, and a 
proposal for introducing a free choice of hospital entered the political agenda for the first 
time during 1993/94 parliamentary session. Initially it only included patients who had 
exceeded the new waiting-time guarantee. A pilot on free hospital choice for all patients 
was established in one of the health regions from June 1994. After a two-year trial period, 
the pilot was evaluated, showing that only a few patients move, mainly due to lack of 
information and transportation costs33. After this initial trial period, new pilot studies 
focusing on information and the role of GPs started34.   
 
As for the second generation, in Norway a new act expanding choice was passed in 1999, 
and became effective in January 2001. It allowed choice among NHS hospitals. From 1 
September 2004, choice was extended to private hospitals and particular hospital units 
within multi-hospital trusts as well as to psychiatric care. New waiting times guarantees, 
activity-based financing (ABF), pro-competition regulation and expanded capacity were 
put into place during 1997-2000. In England, second-generation reforms were officially 
announced in April 2002, as an explicit policy transfer from Scandinavia. From April 
2004, choice will be offered by GPs to patients who have been waiting for elective 
surgery for more than 8 months. From December 2005, choice will be expanded to all 
patients. During 1999-2001, an ambitious plan of capacity and expenditure expansion 
was designed and launched. Also, during 2003-5, ABF is progressively introduced, in 
parallel with expanded choice 9.   
 
 
2.3. Patient choice, market-based reforms and benefits expansion 
 
As Vrangbæk and Østergren remark2, the two waves of patient choice reforms in NHS 
systems had very different, and somewhat contradictory, policy objectives. We extend on 
their framework by proposing that the first generation of pro-choice reforms was 
envisaged as an element of the early market-based reforms, mainly a means to achieve 
cost-containment via price competition, or expand productivity (without increasing costs) 
via waiting-times based competition. Hence, choice was launched in parallel with frozen 
or retrenched public financing and/or benefits. Those restrict the availability or 
accessibility of services, which in turn depresses effective patient mobility and choice3. In 
contrast, within the second generation, extended patient choice schemes have been 
increasingly linked in NHS countries to wider reform packages aimed at expanding 
capacity, productivity and access, as well as health expenditure1. The evolution of health 
policy in both Norway and the UK suggests a cycle of policy from market-based pro-
choice reforms, through reinforced central control and cost-containment, towards 
expanded supply and choice. This suggests that there maybe a long-term policy cycle 
which combines choice with extended or rationed benefits depending on the economic 





















In Norway, three other reforms have been introduced more or less in parallel with 
enlarged patient choice. Ownership of hospitals was transferred upwards from 19 
counties to the central state in 2002. Hospitals were organised into health enterprises 
(trusts), with 5 regional agencies (RHE) overseeing them. Second, a patient list system 
was introduced in primary care in 2000, in order to reinforce GPs’ role. Finally, Activity 
Based Financing (ABF) was introduced and gradually expanded from 1997. In the UK, 
others reforms launched in parallel are regional devolution, and delegation of 
commissioning and other powers to PCGs.  
 
 
3. Spatial mobility and patient choice: the figures 
 
In this section we present the macro-level developments in patient mobility between 1999 
and 2003 in Norway, that is, in the period immediately before and after the choice 
reforms came into effect in 2001.The analysis focus on changing patterns in mobility 
among elective inpatients, including day care and day surgery. A patient is defined as 
being mobile when s/he is treated outside a predefined geographical area, such as for 
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Figure 3 shows that during the period one in three patient contacts is with a public 
hospital different from their local one. About one out of four elective inpatient contacts is 
with a hospital outside the local health enterprise. In addition, some 3-4 % of acute, non-
elective hospital inpatients were also mobile during the period. These figures can be 
understood to represent what we initially termed either forced or induced mobility, which 
remains fairly stable. As for patient mobility outside the patient’s home county and health 
care region, we observe a slight increase after 2001. In NHS systems, here is where we 
would expect to find an increase in mobility due to the patients own choice, as 
administrative barriers and transportation costs start to be non-negligible. In addition, 
figure 3 also show a change in institutional mobility towards private for-profit hospitals. 
While in 1999 when about 1 percent of all patients were treated by private providers, they 
now treat 5.5 percent of elective inpatients in Norway. Preliminary figures (not presented 
here) from the first nine months of 2004, suggest a further increase in the share of 
patients treated outside public hospitals.    
 
The relative small growth in patient mobility in relative terms can be partly a result of the 
significant raise in activity experienced during 1999-2003. For elective inpatients, the 
total number of patient contacts has gone up by about 181.000, from 458.000 to 639.000. 
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The number of patients treated outside their own region has risen from 40.500 to 62.400 
patient contacts. The number treated outside their home county has increased by 37.000 
(from 70.300 in 1999 to almost 107.700 five years later). The most marked growth, 
however, took place in the private sector in which the number of patient contacts almost 
doubled from 18.404 in 2002 to 35.095 the year after. We are unable to measure mobility 
within the Oslo region and county due to data problems (see Annex), what can further 
depress our mobility estimates.           
  
 
4. Micro-regulations, incentives and other supporting mechanisms 
  
Neither regions nor hospitals can, as a general rule, refuse to treat, or give less priority to, 
patients from other regions in Norway. The micro-regulations do however allow hospitals 
to reject new patients under exceptional circumstances, whenever the needs of its 
assigned populations are not been adequately addressed for instance due to long waiting 
lists. Will this lead to implementation gaps, patient selection and cherry picking? The 
answer depends on two other critical questions, namely: (1) what are the incentives for 
hospitals to admit free choice patients? And (2) Do hospitals have sufficient capacity to 
attend new choice patients timely? Question (1) has to do with the micro-regulation of 
choice and the way hospitals are financed. Question (2) is directly related with the issue 
of access and the problem of waiting times. Both questions refer to supply-side factors. 
Whether or not choice will happen also depends on factors on the demand-side, such as 
(3) available information and patients’ willingness to choose, and (4) GPs’ advice on 
choice of hospital. We examine each of these issues in turn. Some other demand-side 
factors, such as waiting time guarantees, and subsidized transportation costs, are 
discussed within sections 4.1. and 4.2., which focus on related supply-side mechanisms.   
  
4.1. Which are the incentives to make free choice happen? 
 
Activity-based financing (ABF) constitutes a powerful incentive to make choice happen, 
as it implies that the more patients are treated, the more hospitals’ income will increase. 
In Norway, ABF was introduced in the allocation of hospital funds to county councils 
from 1 July 1997, as a necessary pre-condition to fulfil the waiting list guarantee adopted 
by parliament in 1990. A fraction of the block grants to the county councils was replaced 
by a matching grant depending on the number and composition of hospital treatments. At 
first, 30 % of the DRG-based cost of a treatment was refunded from the state. From 1 
January 1998, the percentage was increased to 40% and from 1 January 1999, to 50%10. 
In 2005 it is set to 60%. Counties were free to decide on how to allocate resources to 
hospitals. It turned out that 15 of Norway's 19 county governments readily introduced 
ABF to fund hospitals in 1997, and the remaining 4 did so during 1998-200011.  
 
There are few if any financial constrains for patients in Norway to exercise their rights, as 
they only have to pay a small fraction of the actual transportation costs (limited to about € 
50). The remaining costs have to be paid by the region to which the patient is assigned 
geographically. The idea is to give incentives to regions to improve the performance of 
their local hospitals so that their patients do not opt out. But these increased expenses can 
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also make the RHEs somewhat reluctant towards the reform. Given the long distances 
involved in the case of Norway, choice will in some instances entail considerable costs, 
especially for regions in the North. As they are also among the poorest, extended choice 
may exacerbate equity problems. Data on the period 2003-4 shows that the average costs 
per mobile patient for the RHEs vary from €10 (South), to €200 (North). 
 
In England, some important restrictions derived from the micro-regulation of choice are 
that private or overseas hospitals can only be chosen if their fees are below the national 
average public tariff; and that travel costs will not be covered for all patients. This is in 
spite of the concern expressed by patients and GPs in the pilot studies preceding the 
enactment of the scheme. ABF financing started to operate in April 2003, and was also 
explicitly adapted from the Scandinavian experiences, and by 2005 it should already 
account for 60% of total funding. Full implementation is scheduled for 20089. 
 
Patient choice can not been seen in isolation from other changes that have taken place in 
Norway in the same period, often designed as integral elements of market-based reforms, 
which also condition its impact on the health system. The most prominent of these 
changes are hospital mergers. During 2002-4, about 70-80 hospitals plus some smaller 
institutions were re-organized into 25 health enterprises11. Hospital concentration may be 
a way of obtaining other goals such as cost containment. It does, however, de facto mean 
a reduction of possible alternatives to choose. This possibility was also acknowledged by 
the Parliament, through the 2004 change in the Patient Right Act, when patients got the 
right to select a particular hospital/department within a multi-hospital trust. In England, 
99 mergers of hospital trusts and other providers took place between 1997 and 200212. At 
present, there are no micro-regulations in England to prevent that trust mergers curtail 
patient choice of hospital.   
 
4.2. Do hospitals have sufficient capacity to attend new choice patients timely? 
 
During the last decade, physician numbers have increased in all OECD countries but 
Canada and Sweden; day and long-term care facilities have expanded; hospital beds have 
decreased; and hospital productivity has tended to increase. In addition, in both Norway 
and the UK, significant expansions of available capacity through contracting out private 
and foreign hospitals, and expanding public staff and facilities, have been launched 
during the last years, which are of critical importance to make choice feasible. These 
supply-side developments have been driven in turn by significant demand-side factors, 
such as the expansion of patient rights via waiting-time guarantees (WTG) and expanded 
choice1.   
 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark, England and the Netherlands pioneered the introduction of 
WTG1. In Norway, they were introduced in 1990 (focusing on treatment within six 
months), and considerably extended in 2001. Patients were then given the right of having 
their health situation assessed within 30 days. In the UK, as in Sweden, six month WTG 
were introduced in 1992. In both countries, the impact of the new regulations was mixed, 
with WT resuming their growth after a short period of decline, and doctors reporting that 
they interfered with clinical prioritization criteria. To avoid the later, new 
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microregulations establishing as WT targets that the WTG are fulfilled for most, but not 
necessarily all, patients (e.g. 80%)1. 
 
4.3. Patients’ willingness to choose and the critical issue of information 
 
Previous research on the US (see Box 1) suggests: that a few categories of patients are 
interested in opting out their local providers; that they have specific information needs; 
and that new information transmission tools and methods, targeted to specific patient 
groups, should be designed in order to make the most out of patient choice 13 14 15 16 17 18 
19 20 21 22 23 24 25 .  
 
 
    





























In addition, recent evidence on patient attitudes and information tools in the UK (Box 2) 
emphasizes that26 27 28 : there is widespread support for choice as well as for customized 
performance information among patients; league tables are useful for some indicators but 
contextualized, background information is given priority. In Norway, the available data 
also suggests that choice is widely appreciated as an end in itself, with 73% of citizens 
being in favour of its introduction in 1998 (as compared with 93% for the GP list system; 
and 60%-50% for expanded competition and private insurance). As for information, there 
has been experimentation with web-based league tables and a free telephone line starting 
in 1998-2000. However, previous evidence suggests that this approach has limited impact 
Box 1. Research on the US suggests that...  
 
- 1. Patients forced to choose a new provider (due to change of residence, or  retirement of 
previous physician), patients who are unsatisfied, and chronic patients, are interested in, and do 
make effective use of, information oriented towards choosing a new provider 13 14  
- 2. Information should be adapted to different audiences15; specially, chronic patients, less 
educated patients and ethnic minorities are likely to have special needs16. For instance, chronic 
patients need process rather than outcome indicators, given that the final outcomes of chronic 
care are only evident after long periods of time17 
- 3. Methods other than league tables or practice profiles can be effectively used to target 
information. Targeted individual counselling to patients interested in choosing a new GP 
obtained good results18; and group-produced customized information by which a number of 
patients engage in lengthy, in-depth group discussions with a doctor and a nurse has worked well 
in related fields like lifestyle counselling19 
- 4. When decisions about choice of provider are framed as directed to avoiding risks (rather than 
to obtaining better quality of care), patients’ comprehension, valuation and use of performance 
information increases20  
- 5. In areas with intense competition among providers, report cards are used and have an effective 
impact21 
- 6. Patients are selective in using performance indicators, and focus on those more interesting to 
them22 
- 7. Consumers want information which is provider-specific 19  
- 8. Comparisons among providers from a same local area are preferred over national 
comparisons23 
- 9. Utilization and choice patterns seem more related to service availability at the community and 
group practice level (e.g. ratio of physicians per pop.) than to different practice styles among 
physicians 24 
- 10. All stakeholders should be involved in the development of information instruments 14, 25 
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unless GP direct guidance to patients is used as a complement29. There is a lot to be 
learned in this field from the UK, which starting experimenting with league tables and 
other information tools in the mid 1990s; and passed explicit regulation mandating GPs 
to offer choice of hospital to patients, and support them in making it feasible (see next 
section). Also, the policy transferability to the EU of the very interesting US policy 






















4.4. The involvement of GPs 
 
A specific feature of health care is that often a joint patient-physician demand is 
involved, due to the marked asymmetries of information, and the centrality of GPs and 
other first contact physicians in the process of defining needs and preferences for 
specialist care. This seems clearly the case as for hospital choice. A recent European 
survey confirms that GP advice is considered by patients to be the main and more trusted 
source of information4. Therefore, in order to make the most out of patient choice of 
hospital, a critical requirement is that primary care has enough power and capacity to 
assume new roles in shared decision-making and patient advice. 
 
If the capacity and power resources of GPs are not expanded prior to the expansion of 
their role in patient choice of hospital, excessive workload could lead to lowered 
professional morale and eventually an implementation gap. In 2003, almost 90% of GPs 
in the UK feared that increased workload would be the result of the government plans of 
implementing patient choice of hospital starting in 200533. However, 65% had positive 
attitudes towards offering choice to patients. In 2003-4, only about 30% of GPs in 
Norway held a positive attitude towards the reform. The relatively negative initial 
attitudes of Norwegian GPs could reflect similar concerns about increased pressure on 
them. In fact, excessive workload (together with the no. of years worked as a GP, and 
lack of access to internet) are among the main predictors of GPs having a negative 
attitude towards choice of hospital. Even if the available evidence for the UK points to 
insignificant increases in mean consultation time for choice patients33, fears of increased 
Box 2. The initial evidence on the UK suggests that 26 27 28: 
 
- 11. Patients agree that performance should be measured 
- 12. Few patients have been exposed to performance data and other information tools yet  
- 13. Many patients initially react negatively to league tables, but after getting familiar with the 
material, most support that performance indicators should be collected and published 
- 14. Patients want detailed, customized information about local services rather than standardized, 
generally comparative information 
- 15. Dr Foster type of guides, which add detailed descriptive reports of providers to comparative 
indicators, frame comparisons at the local level, and have well-designed presentation formats are 
preferred over the Department of Health league tables-only approach; also, the independence of Dr 
Foster organization from government control increases the credibility of the information  
- 16. Patients are more interested in comparative information about waiting times, physicians’ special 
interests, clinical experience, and success rates; and less interested in issues such as mortality rates. 
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workload can prevent GPs from involvement in reform implementation. The best hospital 
consultants have reasons to be similarly worried, as they would probably attract a great 
deal of the new patient flows. No incentives are in place to compensate professionals for 
the higher workload expected, what cast doubts on the feasibility of adequate reform 
implementation. 
 
In spite of reluctant attitudes among Norwegian GPs, 48% of the doctors reported that the 
introduction of the reform had made them change their referral patterns to some extent, 
and only 9.2% had not changed their referral pattern at all. Empirical analysis shows that 
the factors affecting the likelihood of GPs offering and authorizing referrals to a hospital 
different from the local one are the following. On the supply-side, long waiting times, 
high infection rates and perceived low competence at the local hospital have positive 
effects; while a long travel distance to an alternative hospital has negative effects. On the 
demand side, patients’ preferences for a quick treatment have positive effects, while 
preferences for treatment home, old age, and low functional ability are negative 
predictors. Patients´ gender and education has no effects. In the UK, an official 2003 pilot 
prior to the introduction of choice suggests that around 25% of GPs offered choice to all 
or most patients, and that they were more likely to have a positive attitude towards the 
reforms than other GPs9.    
 
 
5. The impact of patient choice 
 
5.1. Who chooses? Determinants of choice at the individual level 
 
Most empirical research on hospital choice takes Andersen’s conceptual model from the 
1960s as the theoretical point of departure30. Since the late 1960s this theoretical 
framework has been developed further. Here, we base our empirical analysis on the 
contribution of Kurz and Wolinsky31. The two authors argue, in line with Andersen’s 
initial model that four sets of factors are likely to influence patients’ decision of which 
hospital to be treated at. They distinguish between predisposing (e.g. demographics and 
social characteristics), enabling (financial resources), the patient’s need for medical care 
(e.g. perceived needs/self rated health), and previous utilization of health care services. 
Another vein of research has focused more upon the impact of geographical distance (i.e. 
travel distance) upon hospital choice. Since one of the aims of the free choice reform was 
to reduce the geographical differences in access to hospitals, we have also included a 
measure of the patients travel time in our empirical model. In this analysis we limit 
ourselves to investigating the impact of the individual level (patient) characteristics on 
choice.  
 
Multivariate analysis of individual microdata on patients treated outside their local 
hospitals in Norway (from the SINTEF survey), suggests that individual characteristics of 
the patient are weak but still significant predictors of hospital choice, with the exception 
area of residence. Some 40% of patients reported to have chosen to move. After having 
controlled for all the other variables in the model the only significant difference with 
respect to education is the one between those having completed a university degree and 
those with primary education. Students have a higher probability to choose hospital 
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compared with those currently working. A significant negative association remains 
between frequent use of services and choice; and between self-rated health and choice.  
 
The evidence examined for Norway suggests that healthier and better educated patients 
are more likely to make effective use of their choice rights. And hence that expanded 
choice reforms, unless counterbalanced by adequate policy (e.g. supporting sicker and 
poorer patients´ choice) may raise equity concerns. While the issue was anticipated in the 
UK, and addressed via public consultation and a policy report (see section 6), in Norway 
remains unaddressed.  
 
5.2. Efficiency, access, quality and satisfaction 
 
As for the first generation reforms in the UK, the evidence on the effects of GP 
fundholders’ choice of hospital on behalf of their patients points to considerable 
reductions in referral costs, hospital prices, and waiting times for mobile patients. This 
could, however, be at the expense of some loss of quality, as hospitals with more 
competition potential tended to display higher mortality rates in England 8. In Norway, as 
in other Scandinavian countries, first generation policies and pilots apparently had little 
effect on mobility, productivity or access, most probably due to lack of information and 
incentives as well as scarce GP involvement34 35 2 36. 
 
As for second generation reforms, in Norway hospital production increased considerably 
after the introduction of ABF, and later extended choice. For inpatients measured in 
DRG-equivalents there was an average yearly increase in hospital activity of 3.2 per cent 
in the period from 1997 to 2000, compared with 2.0 per cent per year in the period from 
1992 to 1996. From 2001 to 2003 the average yearly increase measured by DRG-
equivalents exceeds 6 per cent. A consequence of the increased activity is a reduction in 
waiting time. Reaching a top in year 2000, when waiting time for elective treatment was 
approximately 240 days (average waiting time for patients waiting for treatment), waiting 
times have since decreased to a level of 88 days by the end of 2004 (see Figure A in the 
Annex for more details). In contrast, in England and Sweden, were ABF was not in place, 
the initial results obtained were unsatisfactory1 (see section 4.2).  
 
In Norway, there is also evidence that patients who are offered choice are more satisfied 
even if they opt to remain at their local hospital. However, six month after expanded 
choice was enacted; citizens’ perceived self-efficacy in choosing hospital was still 
markedly low37. In spite of that, 23% of patients expressed their interest in freely 
choosing hospital in 200238. In the UK, a pilot conducted in 2003 shows that patients who 
were offered choice by their GPs have a high perceived self-efficacy as for their capacity 
to choose hospital, and higher satisfaction levels. This is in spite of the fact that most 




6. Which are the issues at stake? 
 
6.1. The policy issues 
 
Patient choice of hospital can be defended as a right (i.e. an end in itself), or as a means 
to achieve other system goals. As a democratic right, it requires expanded public 
coverage, and improved access. It is also considered as one of several possible market 
mechanisms geared towards greater competition, and therefore higher efficiency 
(Saltman and von Otter 1995). Patients are expected to choose the best performing 
hospitals; then, if money follows patients, efficient providers will be rewarded and 
inefficient ones will lose business. The double nature of choice as a right and as an 
efficiency driver also explains the broad consensus across stakeholders on its desirability.  
 
But it also builds up a certain contradiction of policy goals. The expansion of patient 
rights is likely to increase expenditure (and also allocative efficiency); in contrast, market 
competition often seeks cost-containment as a critical long-term goal. A more cost-
efficient use of hospital capacity in turn often requires longer WT, which reduce access 
and curtail choice. Competition can also result in increasing homogeneity across 
hospitals, what reduces the scope for choice2. In addition, patient choice combined with 
economic incentives can have unintended negative effects upon system performance. 
First, it can expand expenditure and make cost-containment and planning difficult. 
Second, inequalities between choice and non-choice patients may develop. Third, sicker 
and less educated patients can find significant barriers to make their choice rights 
effective. Fourth, poorer regions can see their resources drained, as a higher proportion of 
patients are likely to opt out of the local hospital to other regions.  
 
Other problems which can make the operation of choice difficult, and should therefore be 
addressed by policy-making in the future, are as follows. First, patients can find difficult 
to make sound choices on their own, given asymmetric information. GP advice is 
therefore critical to make the most out of choice. Second, and as feared by professionals, 
choice can then involve higher workload for already overloaded GPs. Recent research in 
the UK suggests that even if the workload on GPs does not increase significantly, the 
information and management support schemes can be difficult to design and costly to 
run9. Third, there is a trade-off between choice and continuity of care which can be 
especially detrimental for chronic patients. Fourth, sicker and less educated patients can 
find significant barriers to make their choice rights effective. Fifth, poorer regions can see 
their resources drained, as a higher proportion of patients are likely to opt out from the 
local hospital to other regions. 
 
A more profound objection to patient choice is that the mechanisms triggered by 
competition are unlikely to foster structural changes in a market like public hospital care, 
characterized by very high set-up costs; substantial economies of scale, scope and 
learning; strong loyalty of communities to their local hospital; and relatively standard 
processes and products. As emphasized in the literature on school choice “the best 
schools cannot be stretched like elastic”39 to make room for more children. In addition, 
the option of forcing inefficient hospitals out of business is not fully credible, especially 
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in tax-funded systems in which they are often publicly owned. Moreover, and as 
originally remarked by Hirschman40, allowing patients the right of exit, so that they can 
opt out from their local hospitals, can interfere with other parallel change-promoting 
mechanisms such as voice and loyalty, thereby reducing the prospects that the less 
efficient hospitals could see their performance improved2.   
 
 
6.2. Policy lessons and proposals 
 
As for the mechanisms required to make the best out of choice, (a) expanded capacity, (b) 
economic incentives linked to activity, (c) information transmission tools, and (d) GP 
advice, emerge from the analysis as key complementary policy instruments. Norway 
pioneers in 1997 the nation-wide introduction of (b) ABF; together with complementary 
measures (a) to expand capacity such as expanding patient choice to private and foreign 
hospitals in 2000-2002. In the UK, the emphasis is first placed on (c) information tools 
and (d) GP advice. As a result, there are already available innovative instruments in the 
field of information. Among these are the experimental guides and hospital cards to 
inform patient choice of hospital recently designed by Dr Foster and the University of 
Nottingham, and commissioned by the Department of Health41 based on an evaluation 
study of the needs and barriers to information use by patients in primary care settings33. 
Also, the role and powers of GPs has been extraordinarily strengthened during the last 
decades, and specific regulations are in place which mandates that GPs offer choice of 
hospital to all patients.   
 
The fact that among the four main pre-conditions for expanded patient choice, Norway 
focused on the first two (a-b), while the UK on the other two (c-d) has quasi-experimental 
advantages for hypotheses testing and policy transfer. The data examined in sections 3 
and 5 suggests that pre-conditions a-b are more effective in making expanded choice 
happen, while minimizing the risk of decreased equity or access; and that pre-conditions 
c-d are more critical to guarantee that choice has a positive impact on other critical health 
system goals such as productive efficiency, quality, patient satisfaction and 
empowerment. .  
 
In the UK, the Scandinavian example was taken into account in designing an ambitious 
plan of capacity and activity expansion for the period 2002-2004. Given the pioneering 
role of Norway, and the marked structural and policy similarities with England, data on 
the course and impact of reforms can be of great utility for the challenges ahead. In 
Norway, some of the key policy issues which remain undressed relate to the role of GPs: 
primary care is still governed by municipalities, what makes integration with other levels 
of care problematic; waiting lists in primary care are long, what suggests problems of 
under-capacity; and there is no formal obligation of GPs to offer, and provide advice on, 
choice.  In addition, experimentation with information tools has only started, and mainly 
focused on web-based information. In both realms, the UK experience offers important 
policy learning value for Norway.  
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Last, but not least, Norwegian data suggests that healthier and better educated patients are 
more likely to make effective use of their choice rights than other patients, what raises 
equity concerns. In the UK, a public consultation was conducted during August-
December 2003 in order to anticipate the potential dangers for equity which could result 
from the choice reforms, and elaborate on the feasible policy mechanisms which could be 
put in practice to address them. The resulting report, Building on the best – choice, 
responsiveness and equity, published by the Department of Health, can offer important 




The analysis carried out in this paper has tried to cast new light on the issue of choice by 
formulating some analytical and policy proposals based on a comparative analysis of 
recent data on Norway and the UK. The comparative method helps us to isolate 
intervening mechanisms and analyse impact. A summary of our results and policy 























Research on of patient choice is still scarce and plagued with important conceptual, 
measurement, and data problems. Confusion between mobility and choice, little 
knowledge on intervening mechanisms, and lack of official data on the magnitude and 
impact of choice, has been the main obstacles to analyze the phenomenon in the past. 
During the last few years, however, knowledge and data have expanded rapidly.  
 
Some proposals for further research are as follows. On the one hand, and in spite of the 
progress made, detailed data analysis is still often lacking; and basic analytical issues still 
Box 3. Summary highlights 
• From September 2004, Norwegian legislation on patients’ choice became one of the most 
generous in the world; in the UK a parallel reform path has been followed, which will be 
completed in April 2005  
• In order to make choice happen and have the expected results, expanded capacity and 
incentives to increase activity are required in overloaded NHS systems such as Norway and 
the UK  
• Activity-based financing was introduced in 1997 in Norway, and capacity expansion started 
also earlier, offering important lessons for the UK  
• Available data on the early impact of reforms in Norway suggests that waiting times fell more 
rapidly, and patient mobility to private, contracted-out hospitals significantly increased 
• Fears of increased pressure on professionals, and patients’ difficulties to operate choice, can 
hinder implementation; also, data for Norway suggest that social and regional inequalities may 
widen as a result of reforms 
• Hence, other complementary tools would be required to make the most out of hospital choice, 
such as a strengthened powers and capacity at the primary care level, specific microregulations 
and incentives, and new information transfer tools; the UK can offer key policy lessons in 
these fields 
• The right of opting out should not run counter to other improvement mechanisms, such as 
patients’ voice and loyalty 
 15
require empirical and conceptual clarification. On the other hand, the amount of data and 
knowledge already accumulated on the issue calls for more specific, sophisticated 
research strategies. Specific, in that the focus is on comparing selected groups of patients, 
specific DRGs, different incentives to boost activity and capacity, and diverse 
information transmission methods. Sophisticated, in that a control groups are established 










































1. Data sources for Norway 
 
Data used in section 3.3:  
The data used in the macro level analysis was taken form the Norwegian Patient 
Register (NPR). NPR was founded in 1997 by the Ministry of Health and Social 
Services, who owns the register. NPR is run by the research institute SINTEF Health. 
NPR collects and verifies patient data from all public somatic hospitals and psychiatric 
institutions in Norway, as well as from some private hospitals. The register includes data 
on all hospitalizations at somatic hospitals (24-hour hospitalizations and outpatients), 
births registered at county delivery rooms in addition to some outpatient treatment at 
somatic outpatient departments. Furthermore, the register contains patient data from 
psychiatric institutions for adults as well as for children.  
Data used in section 4.4 
 
A cross-sectional survey with a self-administered questionnaire was conducted among 
all GPs in Norway during the winter 2003/2004. The survey was carried out as a project 
of collaboration between the Research Institute of the Norwegian Medical Association 
and the Department of Health Management and Health Economics at the University of 
Oslo. The questionnaire was sent to 3388 GPs. After one follow-up round 1633 
questionnaires were returned, giving us a response rate of 48.4 %. 
 
Data used in section 5.1  
 
A cross-sectional survey with a self-administered questionnaire was conducted among 
Norwegian patients during summer and fall 2004. The survey was carried out in 
cooperation with the SINTEF Research Institute in Oslo, and was financed by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Health. The questionnaire was sent out to a sample of patients 
who had been treated at a hospital during the last quarter of 2003 or the first quarter in 
2004. The sample consisted of 4000 patients were 3000 had not been treated at their 
local hospital and 1000 were treated locally. After one reminder we obtained an answer 
back from 1678 patients, giving us a final response rate of 47 %. In the analyses below 
we have included respondents aged 15 years and above, giving us a sample of 1.488 




2. Methodological and data problems 
 
Even though we have been able to describe the development in patient mobility during 
the past five years, some present and future methodological and data problems has to be 
addressed. First of all it should be noted that during the past few years several reforms 
has taken place more or less simultaneously within the Norwegian health care system. 
Among these are the recent hospital ownership reform (i.e. the central governments 
takeover of the hospitals from the counties from 1. January 2002). This reform raises 
some particular challenges with respect to analyzing data on patient mobility over time 
(i.e. the number of possible “destinations” for the patients has been altered). The main 
reason for this is the creation of larger hospital enterprises, often consisting of several 
hospitals each. The process of hospital mergers implies that the number of “units” in our 
data set is also changing. In the analyses presented above, we have “overcome” this 
problem by using the pre 2002 hospital structure. The data for the transitional periods of 
2002 and 2003 have still been collected for the same hospitals as prior to the reform. In 
the future, however, this problem might become more sever. Secondly, there has been a 
redrawing of the health care enterprises geographical catchment areas. This 
development has mostly taken place within and in the close vicinity of Oslo. The 
redefining of catchment areas will represent a greater problem for future analyses, as 
most of them have come into effect in 2004, a year which we have not included in the 
analyses.  
 
The first, and perhaps most important data limitation, is the fact that we cannot 
distinguish empirically between the three types of patient mobility presented in the 
introduction of the paper. Thus, we are not able to determine on the basis of these 
register data whether the observed increase in inter-county or inter-regional mobility is 
the result of a more patients using their right to choose or whether it is forced mobility 
that has changed. Secondly, we would expect the patient mobility to be greatest in and 
around Oslo. In Oslo there are four large hospitals (in addition to the National Hospital), 
each with their own geographical catchment-areas, situated in close proximity to each 
other. Unfortunately, we do not have access to a variable describing the patient’s exact 
area of residence within the capital, which would have allowed us to fully explore the 
mobility taking place within the municipality of Oslo. 
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